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ABSTRACT
When an acquirer purchases a target and assumes the target’s deferred revenue liability,
accounting standards codification 805 requires that the acquirer recognize the target’s deferred
revenue at its estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. If the target’s deferred revenue book
value exceeds its fair value, the portion of deferred revenue written down will never be
recognized as revenue for the acquirer under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
In this study, I investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) compensation
incentives on the fair value measurement of deferred revenue liabilities in acquisitions. If a larger
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay is based on performance metrics tied to GAAP revenue,
CEOs have incentives to minimize deferred revenue write-downs because these write-downs
reduce post-acquisition revenues. I predict and find that CEOs with a larger proportion of cash
incentive pay based on performance metrics tied to GAAP revenue write down less deferred
revenues. Additionally, I predict and find that CEOs with a larger proportion of cash incentive
pay based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for deferred revenues which would have been
recognized as future revenues (i.e., ghost revenues) write down more deferred revenues. These
results provide evidence that manager opportunism in fair value measurement following
acquisitions extends to deferred revenue liabilities as well as assets.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
Fair value measurement allows managers to exercise discretion for either informative or
opportunistic reasons. When accounting for business combinations, managers appear to adjust
the fair values of certain acquired assets in order to increase their compensation (e.g. Shalev et
al. 2013). However, there are no studies investigating whether managers exercise discretion over
the fair value measurement of deferred revenue liabilities assumed in acquisitions. Accounting
Standards Codification (ASC) 805 (previously classified as Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) 141R) requires that the acquirer recognize the target’s deferred revenue
liability at its estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. Because deferred revenue is
typically recorded on the balance sheet at historical cost (i.e., the value of the consideration or
payment previously received), the book value of a target’s deferred revenue often exceeds its fair
value, leading to a deferred revenue write-down.1 Under generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), the acquirer cannot recognize the portion of the deferred revenue written
down as post-acquisition revenue even if the acquirer satisfies the related performance
obligations.
In this study, I investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) compensation
incentives on deferred revenue write-downs. When CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on
accounting performance metrics tied to post-acquisition GAAP revenue, CEOs have incentives
to minimize deferred revenue write-downs in order to maximize the revenue recognized under
GAAP. Therefore, I predict that CEOs of acquirers with a larger proportion of cash incentive pay
based on GAAP revenue (i.e., EBITDA, GAAP earnings, GAAP revenue, etc.) will reduce the
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs.

“Deferred revenue write-down” is the difference between the book value and fair value of a target’s deferred
revenue liability assumed by the acquirer as of the acquisition completion date.
1

1

Separate streams of accounting research examine the usefulness of deferred revenue
liabilities and the usefulness of fair value accounting. For example, prior research finds that
previous regulations accounting for deferred revenues have decreased the likelihood of
managerial opportunistic behavior, but have also reduced the value relevance of earnings and
have led to the mismatching of revenues and expenses (Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber 2005;
Prakash and Sinha 2013; Srivastava 2014). However, prior research evaluating the usefulness of
deferred revenues does not consider how managers' compensation incentives may influence the
fair values of deferred revenues in an acquisition.
Fair value measurement of assets and liabilities often requires significant judgment and
allows managers the ability to exercise discretion. Prior studies find mixed evidence of manager
opportunism in fair value measurement. Some evidence suggests that certain bank assets and
liabilities are value relevant consistent with managers recording appropriate fair values (e.g.
Barth 1994; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1996; Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan 1996; Nelson
1996). In contrast, some evidence suggests that managers exercise discretion in fair value-based
goodwill impairment tests by delaying or reducing the occurrence of goodwill impairments (e.g.
Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li and Sloan 2017). Further evidence
suggests that when accounting for business combinations, managers exercise discretion over the
fair values of acquired assets (Shalev 2009; Shalev et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015;
Paugam, Astolfi, and Ramond 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2017; Lynch, Romney, Stomberg, and
Wangerin 2019; Ashby, Chyz, Myers, and Whipple 2020). However, prior research does not
consider whether managers exercise discretion over the fair value measurement of deferred
revenues assumed in an acquisition. These studies assume that the fair value measurement of
acquired assets and liabilities resembles a purchase price allocation. This means that, holding the
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deal value constant, a larger fair value measurement of one acquired asset leads to a smaller fair
value measurement of another acquired asset. However, the fair value measurement of liabilities
in an acquisition does not necessarily resemble a purchase price allocation because, all else
equal, an increase (decrease) in the fair value of liabilities leads to an increase (decrease) in
goodwill.
Fair value measurement of acquired deferred revenues is of particular concern to
managers, institutional investors, and regulators for several reasons. Deferred revenue writedowns have a significant downward impact on post-acquisition GAAP performance (Dickinson,
Wangerin, and Wild 2016).2 Some managers disclose non-GAAP metrics which include a
portion of the deferred revenue write-down that would have been earned during the period. The
business press refers to these inclusions as “ghost revenues.”3 Although managers claim that the
inclusion is meant to inform investors or increase comparability, recent evidence suggests that
non-GAAP revenue that includes ghost revenue is not incrementally more value relevant than
GAAP revenue on average (Campbell, Gee, and Wiebe 2020). The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) expresses concerns about non-GAAP metrics that include these adjustments
and in some situations issues comment letters either requiring more disclosure or requiring the
firm to cease reporting non-GAAP revenue.4 Furthermore, some firms add back ghost revenues
to managers’ performance metrics. This practice has drawn criticism from the business press

2

The association between deferred revenue write-downs and future revenues exists because deferred revenue writedowns reduce future revenues recognized by the acquirer. Managers or valuation experts do not predict and assign a
fair value to the expected future revenues and then determine what the deferred revenue balance should be. Rather,
they begin their valuation with the deferred revenue book value.
3
See “Companies including Symantec are using ‘ghost revenue’ to calculate bonuses” available from Marketwatch
(May 17, 2018) at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/companies-are-using-ghost-revenue-to-calculate-executivebonuses-2017-11-06
4
See “SEC may be set to crack down on companies that adjust revenue” available from Marketwatch (November
26, 2019) at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-may-be-set-to-crack-down-on-companies-that-adjust-revenue2019-11-22
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which claims that managers use deferred revenue write-downs as a “cookie-jar” reserve to boost
cash incentive compensation.5 Concerns with the usefulness of these non-GAAP performance
metrics have led institutional investors to petition the SEC to require more transparency in proxy
statements for metrics used in calculating CEO compensation.6 Given managers’, investors’, and
regulators’ growing concerns about ghost revenues and deferred revenues write-downs, research
investigating managers’ incentives to adjust deferred revenues write-downs is important.
To the extent managers have discretion over the fair values of deferred revenues, I expect
that CEOs’ incentives to reduce the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increase with
the relative magnitude of cash incentive pay. If CEOs can minimize the magnitude of deferred
revenue write-downs, then they reduce potential ghost revenues or revenues that will not be
recognized even when acquirers satisfy the performance obligations related to the deferred
revenues. By using this strategy, CEOs can maximize their cash incentive compensation by
increasing the chances of meeting performance metric targets tied to GAAP revenue. However,
the incentive to minimize deferred revenue write-downs is less salient if CEOs’ compensation is
based on non-GAAP metrics that either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues.
To examine my research questions, I use a hand-collected sample of 334 material
acquisitions from 2003 to 2018, where the SEC requires the acquirer to disclose the previous
financial statements of the target and the pro forma financial statements of the combined entity.7
In the pro forma balance sheets found in forms 8-K/A or S-4, I collect the deferred revenue
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See https://www.marketwatch.com/story/companies-are-using-ghost-revenue-to-calculate-executive-bonuses2017-11-06
6
See “Investors Push Back on Non-GAAP Comp Metrics” available from Agenda (May 13, 2019) at
https://www.agendaweek.com/c/2276373/279923/investors_push_back_gaap_comp_metrics?referrer_module=emai
lMorningNews&module_order=3&code=YkcxNVpYSnpNVFpBZFhSckxtVmtkU3dnTVRFM01USTJNek1zSURR
eU1EVTJOVEF6T1E9PQ
7
Pro forma refers to the anticipated results of the transaction. In this paper, pro forma does not refer to non-GAAP
disclosure.
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write-downs disclosed under adjustments made in combining the target and acquirer. In 64
percent of the deals in my sample, I find that the acquirer writes down the target’s deferred
revenues to fair value. Deferred revenue write-downs appear to be economically significant, with
the average write-down reducing future revenue per share by $0.15.
Next, I use multivariate regression analyses to examine whether the magnitude of
deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay.
Specifically, I regress deferred revenue write-downs on the proportion of CEO cash incentive
pay to CEO total compensation and a vector of control variables. Consistent with my predictions,
I find that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO
cash incentive pay. My results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of
cash incentive pay is associated with a 20 percent decrease in the deferred revenue write-downs.
This is equivalent to a $0.03 increase in future revenue per share, on average.
Next, I investigate whether the relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay differs when the cash incentive pay is based on nonGAAP metrics that either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues. I find that the
negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash
incentive pay does not exist when CEO cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance
metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues. This suggests that the incentives
to minimize deferred revenue write-downs are less salient when CEO cash incentive pay is not
based on post-acquisition GAAP revenue.
I then explore the impact of each non-GAAP adjustment (either removing the target’s
revenues or including ghost revenues) on the relation between deferred revenue write-downs and
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that the negative relation between deferred
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revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay that I document for
executives with incentive pay based on GAAP accounting performance metrics is also present
when the cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that remove the target’s
revenues. However, I find that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash incentive pay is tied to
non-GAAP performance metrics that include ghost revenues. Moreover, I provide evidence that
the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with the proportion of CEO cash
incentive pay tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that include ghost revenues.
Finally, I examine whether the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that the occurrence of deferred revenue
write-downs does not decrease with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. However,
economic factors appear to impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. Moreover, I
find that that the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP metrics does not
impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. These results suggest that although
CEOs may exercise discretion in determining the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs,
their discretion does not extend to avoiding the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs.
My study makes several contributions to the literature. First, my study is the first to
provide evidence that CEO compensation incentives impact the fair value measurement of
deferred revenue liabilities in an acquisition. This is significant because most prior research
focuses on managers’ incentives to adjust fair values of specific assets acquired in an acquisition
(Shalev 2009; Shalev et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015; Paugam et al. 2015; Zhang and
Zhang 2017; Lynch et al. 2019, Ashby et al. 2020). Furthermore, these studies focus on
managers' incentives to adjust asset fair values that impact acquirers’ future expenses. For
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example, Lynch et al. (2019) find that managers of private firms allocate more of the purchase
price to shorter-lived tangible assets in order to increase depreciation and reduce taxable income.
My study is the first to provide evidence of managers adjusting deferred revenue fair values to
increase future revenues for the acquirer.
Second, my study contributes to the research on non-GAAP disclosure. Recent evidence
suggests that non-GAAP earnings per share is more informative when a firm discloses the metric
in both the proxy statement and the annual earnings announcement (Black, Black, Christensen,
and Gee 2020). However, no research to date investigates the impact of non-GAAP
compensation performance metrics on GAAP accounting choices. I provide unique evidence
suggesting that certain non-GAAP compensation performance metrics can impact managers’ fair
value measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions.
Finally, I examine a setting that has received increased attention from standard setters.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has an ongoing project to research the
potential alternatives for the recognition and measurement of deferred revenues in business
combinations and recently issued a proposed Accounting Standards Update.8 To the extent that
any new accounting standard increases managers’ opportunities to exercise discretion in fair
value measurement, I provide evidence suggesting that certain managers may exercise discretion
in the fair value measurement of deferred revenue to boost post-acquisition revenues.

8

The board is currently reviewing the comment letter feedback to the proposed accounting standard update. See
details at:
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/ProjectUpdateExpandPage&cid=1176175306787
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SECTION II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background
Deferred revenues (also known as contract liabilities) are an obligation a firm has to
transfer goods or services to a customer for which the firm has received payment from the
customer. For instance, airlines most often sell flights to customers who make payments months
in advance. Software firms sell products with contracts that obligate the firms to provide services
and upgrades in the future. Some manufacturers have sell-through contracts with merchandisers
or distributors and are only able to recognize revenue when the product is sold to the final
customer. Generally, when firms fulfill the performance obligations, they can reduce the liability
balance and recognize revenue.9
Acquisitions of targets with deferred revenue liabilities are a common occurrence.10 One
common issue for acquirers of targets with deferred revenue balances is deferred revenue writedowns – often referred to as disappearing revenues11 or a revenue haircut.12 Deferred revenue
write-downs arise from the differences in accounting treatment of deferred revenues in the
normal course of business and of deferred revenues that a firm assumes in a merger or
acquisition. Deferred revenues are generally recorded on the target’s balance sheet at historical
cost (the value of the consideration or payment previously received). However, ASC 805
requires that the acquirer record the target’s assets and liabilities at fair value as of the

9

Up until the end of 2017, ASC 605 was the prevailing standard for deferred revenue. The FASB replaced ASC 605
with ASC 606 to remove weaknesses in the existing requirements, increase the comparability of revenue recognition
practices, and to provide a new framework to address revenue issues. However, under both standards firms record
the deferred revenue liability at historical cost, firms do not adjust the book value to fair value each period, and
firms must fulfil the performance obligations to reduce the liability balance and recognize revenue.
10
In my sample of deal observations identified by SDC that merged with the Compustat database, 52% of the public
targets had deferred revenues.
11
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2016/apr/deferred-revenue-accounting-rule-in-acquisition.html
12
https://www.valuationresearch.com/pure-perspectives/whats-haircut-determining-fair-value-deferred-revenue/

8

acquisition date.13 Similar to other assets and liabilities, the historical cost of deferred revenue
often differs from its fair market value.
To determine the fair market value of deferred revenue, the acquirer must identify all
performance obligations the acquirer assumes, estimate the costs required to fulfill the
performance obligations, and estimate a profit mark-up associated with the costs to fulfill the
obligation. After estimating the costs and profit mark-up, the acquirer must either use the
bottom-up approach or top-down approach to calculate the fair value. The bottom-up approach
calculates the fair value of deferred revenue as the costs to fulfill the future performance
obligations plus a reasonable mark-up on the costs to be incurred. The top-down approach
calculates the fair value by starting with the deferred revenue balance and deducting the
previously incurred costs and the associated profit from the incurred costs. With either approach,
the fair value should reflect what a third party would be willing to receive in exchange for
assuming the deferred revenue liability and performance obligations. If a third party would incur
lower costs for the future performance obligations and/or would be willing to accept a lower
profit than the target’s normal profit, then the acquirer should write down deferred revenues.14, 15
Deferred revenue write-downs can have a significant impact on post-acquisition
performance. Dickinson et al. (2016) investigate how acquisition accounting methods may
partially explain why many mergers and acquisitions show subsequent reduced firm

13

SFAS 141 (effective July 2001) was updated in December 2008, to SFAS 141R, to improve the relevance of
business combination reporting by updating the treatment of certain acquisition costs and target assets. Both SFAS
141 and SFAS 141R (now codified as ASC 805) require that the acquirer record the target’s assets and liabilities at
their fair values as of the acquisition date.
14
It is also possible that deferred revenues can have a fair value write-up. However, this may be a sign that the target
firm is underperforming and could have accepted a larger profit mark-up on the goods or services provided. Because
write-ups are outside the scope of this paper and these particular acquisitions may be significantly different from
normal acquisitions, I exclude observations in my sample where the acquirer writes up deferred revenues.
15
See http://www.globalviewadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/FVLE-Issue-59-Deferred-RevenueValuation-for-Accounting-Standards-Codification-805-Article-by-Ray-Rath-Feb-Mar16.pdf
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performance. They find that part of the decrease in post-acquisition performance stems from fair
value adjustments that lower future gross profit margins through write-ups in inventory values
and write-downs in deferred revenues. In additional analyses, Dickinson et al. (2016) find that
investors and analysts do not appear to understand how these fair value adjustments negatively
impact gross margins. Dickinson et al. (2016) conclude that acquisition accounting standards
requiring write-downs of deferred revenue and write-ups of inventory masks some of the
synergistic efficiencies of the combined entity.
In response to these deferred revenue write-downs affecting post-acquisition
performance, some firms report non-GAAP revenues in earnings announcements with an
adjustment for ghost revenues. Although managers often disclose that this adjustment is meant to
inform investors or increase comparability, the inclusion of ghost revenues in non-GAAP
revenues is not incrementally more value-relevant than GAAP revenues (Campbell et al. 2020).
The SEC responds to these disclosures by issuing comment letters to some firms requiring
managers to disclose why they are reporting deferred revenue adjustments or by requiring
managers to cease reporting the adjusted revenue metrics.16 Some of these firms also add back
ghost revenues to managers’ cash incentive performance metrics, drawing criticism from the
business press which claims that managers use these write-downs as a “cookie-jar” reserve used
to boost cash incentive compensation.17 Concerns with the transparency of non-GAAP
performance metrics have led the Council of Institutional Investors to petition the SEC to amend

16

See https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-may-be-set-to-crack-down-on-companies-that-adjust-revenue-201911-22
17
See https://www.marketwatch.com/story/companies-are-using-ghost-revenue-to-calculate-executive-bonuses2017-11-06
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Regulation G and require firms using non-GAAP financial metrics in calculating cash incentive
to reconcile the adjusted metrics to GAAP metrics in the compensation discussion and analysis.18
Due to managers’, investors’, and regulators’ concerns with deferred revenue writedowns, the FASB initiated a project to research potential alternatives for the recognition and
measurement of deferred revenues in business combinations.19 Recently, the board issued
proposed Accounting Standards Update Business Combinations (Topic 805): Accounting for
Contract Assets and Contract Liabilities from Contracts with Customers. 20 The proposed
standard would require firms to recognize assumed deferred revenues following ASC 606.
Specifically, the board proposed that the timing of payment of consideration on a contract should
no longer affect the amount of revenue recognized by the acquirer. Based on the current
standard, an acquirer would recognize more revenue for the same performance obligations if the
target’s contract with customers requires payments over time rather than full payment in advance
of the performance obligations. Removing the effect of payment timing on revenue contracts
would change the accounting for acquired deferred revenue. Due to the board’s concerns with
the potential costs and benefits of implementing a new standard, research investigating
managers’ incentives to adjust deferred revenue write-downs under the current standard is timely
and important.

See the Council of Institutional Investors’ petition at
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2019/20190426%20CII%20Petition%20revised%20
on%20non-GAAP%20financials%20in%20proxy%20statement%20CDAs.pdf
19
See FASB’s research project list under “Recognition and Measurement of Revenue Contracts with Customers
under Topic 805” for details at:
https://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContent_C&cid=1176169433424&d=&pagename=FASB%2FFAS
BContent_C%2FProjectUpdatePage#Recognition_Measurement
20
The board is currently reviewing the comment letter feedback to the proposed accounting standard update. See
details at:
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/ProjectUpdateExpandPage&cid=1176175306787
18
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Deferred Revenue Literature
Prior research generally focuses on the impact of previous regulations on the decision
usefulness of revenues and deferred revenues. Standard setters issued the Statement of Position
(SOP) 97-2 in December of 1997 to mitigate software firms’ ability to shift between deferred
revenues and revenue across reporting periods. Following its implementation, firms were less
likely to manage earnings via discretionary revenue estimates, but the overall value relevance of
earnings decreased (Srivastava 2014). Two years later, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin
(SAB) no. 101 to restrict accelerated revenue recognition. Evidence suggests that SAB no. 101
led to a decrease in the likelihood of firms meeting earnings benchmarks (Altamuro et al. 2005).
However, evidence of managers' opportunistic use of discretion in deferred revenues remains
(Caylor 2010). Other research suggests that the prevailing standards led to mismatching of
revenues and expenses as evidenced by changes in deferred revenues adversely affecting the
persistence of profit margins (Prakash and Sinha 2013).
In 2010, the FASB adopted both ASU 2009-13 to address accounting for transactions
with multiple deliverables and ASU 2009-14 to amend SOP 97-2 to improve the usefulness of
revenues by allowing managers more discretion. Recent evidence suggests that these updates
lead to an increase in the value relevance of revenues and earnings, with no evidence of a
decrease in the faithful representation of reported revenues (Myers et al. 2020).
Overall, research provides some evidence that managers exercise discretion over deferred
revenue for either informative or opportunistic reasons. However, no research to date
investigates the determinants of deferred revenue fair values (or write-downs) in an acquisition
or managers’ incentives to exercise discretion over deferred revenue fair values.
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Fair Value Literature
Fair value measurement of assets and liabilities requires judgment and allows managers
to exercise discretion. Prior studies find mixed evidence of manager opportunism in fair value
measurement. Early studies find that banks’ fair value disclosures of loans, securities, long-term
debt, and financial instruments are value relevant (Barth 1994; Barth et al. 1996; Eccher et al.
1996; Nelson 1996). Fair value estimates of investment properties tend to be more accurate
measures of selling prices than historical costs (Dietrich, Harris, and Muller 2000). More recent
evidence suggests that fair value measurement reduces information asymmetry among investors
(Fontes, Panaretou, and Peasnell 2018) and better reflects banks' credit risk (Blankespoor,
Linsmeier, Petroni, and Shakespeare 2013). In contrast, some evidence suggests that managers
exercise discretion in fair value-based goodwill impairment tests by delaying or reducing the
occurrence of goodwill impairments (Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li and
Sloan 2017). CEOs exercise discretion in determining gains from asset securitizations and are
rewarded for gains they report (Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare 2010). More recent studies
find that the relevance of fair values may depend on the nature of the information used in fair
value measurement. SFAS no. 157 requires the disclosure of the level of inputs used to generate
the fair values (i.e. Levels 1, 2, and 3). Evidence suggests that Level 3 measurement of assets and
liabilities, which requires the greatest amount of judgment, leads to increased analyst forecast
dispersions and is less value relevant than other levels of measurement (Song, Thomas, and Yi
2010; Magnan, Menini, and Parbonetti 2015).
Research suggests that managers exercise discretion in fair values of assets assumed in an
acquisition following the implementation of SFAS 141 and SFAS 141R. A majority of acquired
assets, being intangible assets and goodwill, do not have quoted market prices which allow
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managers to exercise discretion by choosing from a reasonable range of possible values (Zhang
and Zhang 2017; Lynch et al. 2019). Managers have incentives to exercise discretion in
assigning fair values to assets and liabilities in an acquisition (also referred to as a purchase price
allocation) to mitigate the negative impact acquired assets (and liabilities) can have on earnings.
For example, larger allocations to tangible and definite-lived intangible assets increase
depreciation and amortization expense, respectively, whereas allocations to goodwill are not
amortized but are subject to impairment testing. Most purchase price allocation research focuses
on managers’ incentives to “over-allocate” the purchase price to goodwill (Shalev 2009; Shalev
et al. 2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015; Paugam et al. 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2017).
Specifically, some studies find evidence that the proportion of the purchase price allocated to
goodwill increases with the proportion of bonuses in CEOs’ pay packages consistent with
managers allocating more to goodwill to reduce amortization and depreciation (Shalev et al.
2013; Bugeja and Loyeung 2015). Ashby et al. (2020) find that managers who report non-GAAP
earnings excluding amortization expense allocate more of the purchase price to definite-lived
intangible assets and less of the purchase price to tangible assets. Finally, Lynch et al. (2019)
find that managers of private firms, who bear lower financial reporting costs, have tax incentives
to allocate more of the purchase price to tangible assets which increases depreciation and reduces
taxable income.
In contrast to conclusions drawn from the purchase price allocation literature, recent
research has highlighted evidence of the overall decision usefulness of fair value accounting in
acquisitions. Particularly, the recorded fair values of acquired intangibles are predictive of future
operating incomes and are positively associated with equity prices (King, Linsmeir, and
Wangerin 2019; McInnis and Monsen 2020). Additionally, the aggregate fair value adjustments

14

made to a target are predictive of post-acquisition cash flows (Blann, Campbell, Shipman, and
Wiebe 2020). However, this relation only exists when the target and acquirer are in the same
industry, when the target does not have significant research and development costs, and when
managers have less incentive to inflate goodwill balances (Blann et al. 2020).
Overall, prior research provides some evidence of managers exercising discretion in fair
values and, in some scenarios, being rewarded for doing so (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; Shalev et
al. 2013). However, no prior research investigates whether managers exercise discretion over the
fair value measurement of deferred revenues. The extant merger and acquisition research
assumes that the fair value measurement of acquired assets and liabilities resembles a purchase
price allocation. This means that, holding the deal value constant, a larger allocation to an
acquired asset leads to a smaller allocation of another acquired asset. However, the fair value
measurement of liabilities in an acquisition does not mechanically resemble an allocation choice
because an increase (decrease) in the fair value of an assumed liability leads to an increase
(decrease) in an acquired asset (most likely goodwill). Because the fair value measurement of
liabilities does not resemble a purchase price allocation, it is not initially clear whether the
incentives to adjust the fair values of assumed liabilities are similar to the incentives to adjust the
fair values of acquired assets.
Hypothesis Development
I begin motivating my hypotheses using a stylized example comparing two scenarios with
different valuations of a target’s deferred revenue assumed by an acquirer in an acquisition on
the first day of the acquirer’s fiscal year. The first scenario shows the outcome of an acquisition
with no deferred revenue write-down. The second scenario shows the outcome of an acquisition
with a deferred revenue write-down. In each scenario, I assume that the target’s deal value is
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$781 million. I also assume the target’s sales for the acquisition year would have been $732
million had it not been acquired and had it not written down any deferred revenue. I further
assume that the acquirer’s sales excluding the target’s sales are $1.574 billion. Additionally, I
assume that the fair value for all assets except goodwill is $582 million, and the fair value for all
liabilities other than deferred revenues is $209 million. Finally, I assume that the book value of
deferred revenue is $42 million, all the performance obligations associated with the $42 million
in deferred revenue on the target books will be fulfilled in the fiscal year of the acquisition, and
that the deferred revenue write-down in scenario (2) is $16 million.21
Scenario
Purchase Price Allocation
Tangible and Intangible Assets other
than Goodwill
Goodwill
Liabilities other than Deferred
Revenue
Deferred Revenue
(Book Value = $42 million)
Total Deal Value

(1)
No Deferred
Revenue
Write-Down

(2)
Deferred
Revenue
Write-Down

$582,000,000

$582,000,000

$450,000,000

$434,000,000

($209,000,000)

($209,000,000)

($42,000,000)

($26,000,000)

$781,000,000

$781,000,000

1,574,000,000

1,574,000,000

732,000,000

716,000,000

2,306,000,000

2,290,000,000

Acquisition Year Revenue Results
Acquirer’s Revenue (Pro-forma)
Target’s Revenue (Pro-forma)
Combined Revenue
Decrease in Revenue

16,000,000

Acquirer’s Diluted Shares

109,000,000

21

All values in this stylized example roughly approximate the average values found in my sample of 334 deal
observation used in this study.
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Per-share impact of write-down

$ 0.15

When comparing the scenarios, it is clear that the acquirer has the largest GAAP
revenue in scenario (1) where there is no deferred revenue write-down. When taking the
difference between the two scenarios, a $16 million decrease in current deferred revenues
leads to a $0.15 per share decrease in the acquirer’s post-acquisition revenue. With acquirers’
average post-acquisition earnings being $0.54 per share in my sample, all else equal, a
deferred revenue write-down could remove more than a quarter of the acquirer’s postacquisition earnings. This stylized example highlights the material impact of deferred revenue
write-downs on an acquirer’s post-acquisition performance.
When holding the deal value constant, any changes in the recorded value of deferred
revenues will also alter the goodwill fair value, as shown in my stylized example. Any
increase (decrease) in the deferred revenue write-down is associated with a decrease
(increase) in goodwill. Additionally, Shalev et al. (2013) find that the proportion of the
purchase price recorded as goodwill increases with the proportion of bonus compensation in a
CEO’s pay package.22 The fair value of goodwill may impact managers' incentives to adjust
the fair value of deferred revenues. The risk of future impairments increases with the
allocation of goodwill (Paugam et al. 2015). However, there is a limit to increasing the
goodwill allocation that occurs with an adjustment to deferred revenue write-downs. The
largest goodwill fair value occurs with no deferred revenue write-down.23 Due to this

22

In untabulated analyses, I validate this finding. In this study, I do not investigate the consequences of the resulting
goodwill allocation, or the impact of bonus compensation on the allocation to goodwill. However, I control for the
allocation to goodwill in my main regressions to remove any confounding effects impacting the relation between the
CEO cash incentive pay and deferred revenue write-downs. My inferences hold when I re-estimate without
including the goodwill allocation in the regressions.
23
It is also possible that deferred revenues can have a fair value write-up, leading to higher goodwill allocations.
However, this occurrence is rare. Because write-ups are outside the scope of this paper and these particular
acquisitions may be significantly different from normal acquisitions, I exclude observations in my sample where the
acquirer writes up deferred revenues. Only 5 observations were dropped due to a deferred revenue write-up.
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limitation, it is not clear that minimizing a deferred revenue write-down would lead to an
“abnormal allocation” or “over-allocation” of goodwill that could lead to a significant
increase in impairment risk. Additionally, an increase in goodwill would not impact managers'
performance metrics in the short term, due to managers' ability to delay or reduce the
occurrence of goodwill impairments (e.g., Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2012;
Li and Sloan 2017).
If a CEO can exercise discretion over the fair values of deferred revenues, I expect that
the CEO’s incentives to reduce the magnitude of a deferred revenue write-down increase with
the relative importance of the cash incentive pay.24 Bonuses or non-equity incentive pay are
more likely than other forms of compensation to increase with an increase in accounting
performance metrics (Shalev et al. 2013). Prior research highlights that a majority of firms use
multiple accounting metrics like reporting earnings, EBIT, or sales as performance measures (all
of which are directly impacted by the target’s revenues post-acquisition) to determine CEO
bonuses (Murphy 1999). Additionally, some research finds that CEO cash compensation is
positively associated with accounting performance metrics (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003)
and that the relative importance of accounting metric-based pay is positively associated with
earnings management (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007). Overall, I expect that CEOs whose

24

Note that I do not claim the CEOs are solely in charge of assigning the fair values of deferred revenue in an
acquisition, but I focus on CEOs because they are the ultimate decisions makers. In addition, CEOs are likely aware
of the impact of fair values of assets and liabilities on future firm performance. I expect managers, valuation experts,
and/or the CFO to provide projections of the impact of an acquisition on future performance to CEOs, and if CEOs
believe that these projections are understated, the CEO may request that the valuations of assets and liabilities be
adjusted. CEOs are likely to hire managers who agree with their point of view and who are incentivized to support
the CEOs' preferences. Therefore, lower-level managers may adjust deferred revenue fair values if requested to do
so. Although I do not claim that all CEOs or managers will intentionally manipulate deferred revenue fair values, I
do assert that managers have implicit biases concerning the valuation of assets and liabilities as well as reported
performance and may be likely to adjust fair values to be consistent with those preferences.
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cash incentive pay constitutes a larger portion of their annual pay are likely to benefit more from
reducing the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: The magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs is smaller when the proportion of
CEO cash incentive pay is larger.
My predicted relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO
cash incentive pay can be attenuated for a few reasons. First, valuation experts and auditors
constrain managers’ discretion over the fair value measurement of deferred revenues. Auditors
and valuation experts may approach their review of liabilities with greater scrutiny than assets.
However, valuation is subjective and even with the scrutiny of valuation experts and auditors,
managers can assign a range of appropriate fair values for the assets and liabilities assumed in
the acquisition. Additionally, auditors and valuation experts are more likely to be concerned
about an understatement of liabilities than an overstatement of liabilities and may mistakenly
apply more scrutiny to smaller deferred revenue fair values than larger deferred revenue fair
values. Second, there is plausibly less judgment involved in determining the fair values of
deferred revenues than for acquired assets. This is because significant asset classes such as
intangible assets, are more likely than deferred revenues to be firm-specific and firm-specific
assets tend to require more judgment. However, there is still a considerable amount of judgment
involved in assessing the fair value of deferred revenues. Managers need to consider multiple
factors related to the fair value of deferred revenues including cost overhead allocations,
estimation of the profit mark-up, multiple element arrangements, and discount rates. Third, if
CEOs do not consider bonus compensation important, incentives to exercise discretion over the
fair values of deferred revenues may not exist. Some research provides evidence suggesting that
cash compensation plays a limited role in providing incentives to managers, inferring that bonus
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or non-equity incentive compensation may not significantly affect managers' choices (Core,
Guay and Verrecchia 2003). However, Murphy (2013) argues that CEOs better understand the
impact of their actions on accounting metrics than on stock prices, and bonuses tied to these
metrics are more tangible and immediate than compensation tied to equity. Additionally, some
research investigating the impact of bonus compensation suggests that bonuses can affect
managers' accounting choices (Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams 2000; Shalev et al. 2013).
Finally, CEOs may face potential post-acquisition consequences as a result of adjusting the fair
value of deferred revenues. For example, the SEC issues comment letters to acquirers regarding
the fair value measurement of acquired assets and liabilities (Lynch et al. 2019). Potential SEC
scrutiny may constrain managers’ discretion over the fair value of deferred revenues.
Furthermore, the reputational cost of receiving a comment letter addressing fair value
measurement may also constrain managers’ discretion.
Although prior research finds that accounting-based metrics tied to GAAP revenue are
the most popular performance metrics in cash incentive pay compensation, many firms use nonGAAP performance metrics. Recent research finds that approximately 15 percent of firms
disclose a non-GAAP earnings per share performance metric in their proxy statements (Black et
al. 2020). Additionally, some evidence suggests that CEO pay is abnormally high when nonGAAP earnings significantly exceed GAAP earnings (Guest, Kothari, and Pozen 2020). In recent
years, firms have started reporting non-GAAP revenue metrics, with 20 percent of earnings
announcements including a non-GAAP revenue measure (Campbell et al. 2020). Some common
adjustments include removing revenues resulting from mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
(commonly called organic revenues) or including a portion of the deferred revenue write-down
(i.e. ghost revenues) from an acquisition. Campbell et al. (2020) find that 43.3 percent of firms
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that report non-GAAP revenue in the earnings announcement adjust for changes to the reporting
entity (M&A, and divestitures), and 8.3 percent include ghost revenues. I expect CEOs with a
larger proportion of cash incentive pay tied to a non-GAAP metric adjusted for the target’s
revenues or ghost revenues to be less likely to directly benefit from reducing the magnitude of
deferred revenue write-down. I also expect these CEOs to write down more of the deferred
revenue relative to CEOs with a larger proportion of cash incentive pay based on performance
metrics tied to GAAP revenue. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: The magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs is larger when the proportion of
CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s
revenue or ghost revenues is larger.
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SECTION III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Data
To test my hypotheses, I use a hand-collected sample of deal observations where the
acquirer assumes the target's deferred revenue and discloses whether or not a write-down
occurred. To create this sample, I first use Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum to identify
completed business combinations with completion dates between January 1, 2003 and December
31, 2018. I restrict the sample to U.S. public acquirers that merge with Compustat, and I exclude
observations where either the acquirer or target are in the financial or utility sectors following
Prakash and Sinha (2013). Next, I restrict the sample to material acquisitions where the acquirer
is required by the SEC to disclose the target’s financial statements similar to the sample selection
criteria in Chen (2019). An acquirer determines whether additional disclosure is required by
using one of three tests defined in Regulation S-X. These tests are the following:
1. Asset Test: If the target’s assets exceed 20 percent of the acquirer’s pre-acquisition
assets, then disclosure of the target’s financial statements is required.
2. Investment Test: If the purchase price of the target exceeds 20 percent of the
acquirer’s pre-acquisition assets, then disclosure of the target’s financial statements is
required.
3. Income Test: If the target’s pre-acquisition pre-tax income exceeds 20 percent of the
acquirer’s pre-acquisition pre-tax income, then disclosure of the target’s financial
statements is required.
To determine whether or not a target meets the disclosure requirements, I restrict my
sample to firms where the deal value exceeds 20 percent of the acquirer's pre-acquisition total
assets. For public targets, if the acquisition does not pass the investment test, I include the
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sample of deal observations where the results of the income test or assets test exceed the 20
percent threshold. Next, I determine which deal observations in my sample will likely disclose a
deferred revenue balance in the financial statements. For public targets, I restrict the sample to
target firms where deferred revenue is populated in Compustat in the fiscal year before the
acquisition. For all other targets, I restrict the sample to firms where the deferred revenue for the
acquirer is populated in Compustat in the fiscal year following the acquisition.
Unless already recorded in the acquirer’s financial statements, the acquirer is required to
report the balance sheet of the acquirer, the balance sheet of the target, and the combination of
the two entities with any adjustments. If the acquirer assumes the target’s deferred revenue
balance and the deferred revenues are written down, then the acquirer discloses the write-down
in the adjustments. I examine the acquirer’s 8-K/A or S-4 filings for the acquisition and collect
the deferred revenue book values, deferred revenue fair values, deferred revenue write-downs,
and other control variables from the disclosed financial statements of the target. I exclude
observations where there is no deferred revenue balance disclosed, no pro forma balance sheet,
or no filings available. I also remove observations where the acquirer writes up the target's
deferred revenue balance.
Next, I merge ExecuComp to the hand-collected dataset for CEO compensation data. For
all deal observations where ExecuComp data is unavailable, I hand-collect the required
information related to the CEO’s compensation from the DEF 14A for the fiscal year of the
acquisition completion. Using the SEC Analytics suite on the Wharton research data services
(WRDS) website, I collect the links to the DEF 14A for the acquisition completion fiscal year. If
no links were present, I use SEC’s EDGAR to collect the DEF 14A filing link. To investigate the
impact of different performance metrics on the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs, I
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collect the financial metrics used to assess the CEO’s annual performance and to calculate their
short-term cash incentive compensation. I also use data from Compustat and the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct other control variables. I summarize my sample
selection procedure in Table 1. Of the 810 observations identified as acquisitions that meet the
SEC’s disclosure requirements and have a deferred revenue balance, 334 satisfy my data
restrictions.
Research Design
To test my first hypothesis regarding the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs, I
regress Def Rev Write Down on my variables of interest and control variables using the following
ordinary least squares regression model:
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +
𝛽3 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽6 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛽8 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽9 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽11 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽12 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε

(1)

The dependent variable, Def Rev Write Down, is equal to the difference between the book
value and the fair value of deferred revenue assumed in the acquisition as disclosed in the pro
forma balance sheet or the deferred revenue write-down disclosed in the adjustment section of
the pro forma balance sheet divided by the deal value. To measure the relative importance of
CEO cash incentive pay, I use three different proxies derived from variables used in prior
research (Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010; Shalev et al. 2013). The first, Bonus, is the
CEO’s bonus compensation scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. The second, NEIP, is the
CEO’s non-equity incentive pay compensation scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. The
third, Bonus/NEIP, is the sum of the CEO’s bonus and non-equity incentive pay compensation
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scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. A negative and significant 𝛽1 coefficient on each of the
incentive pay proxies would be consistent with my prediction that the magnitude of deferred
revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay.
To test my second hypothesis, I augment equation (1) to include NG, an indicator
variable set equal to 1 if the cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that either
removes the target’s revenue or includes ghost revenues, and 0 otherwise. I also include
interactions between NG and each of the incentive pay variables. Given these adjustments, I use
the following ordinary least squares model:
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛿2 𝑁𝐺 +
+ 𝛿3 𝑁𝐺 ∗ (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛿4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛿5 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 +
𝛿6 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛿7 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛿8 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛿9 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛿10 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +
𝛿11 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛿12 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛿13 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛿14 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε

(2)

A positive and significant coefficient on 𝛿3 would be consistent with my prediction that the
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive
pay when tied to non-GAAP metrics. Detailed variable definitions for each test variable are
available in the Appendix.
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SECTION IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in my analyses.25 The mean
(median) deal value for acquisition observations in my sample is $780.7 million ($186 million).
The mean deferred revenue assumed in the acquisition (at book value) is $41.93 million.
Acquirers write down deferred revenues 64 percent of the time, suggesting that this is a common
occurrence. Acquirers write down 32 percent of the book value of acquired deferred revenue, on
average. When scaled by the number of shares used to calculate earnings per share, deferred
revenues amounting to $0.15 per share will never be recognized or recorded as revenue
following the acquisition, on average. I find that almost 20 percent of total CEO compensation is
cash-based incentive pay, on average.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in my analyses where
the observations are partitioned based on whether or not the deferred revenues assumed in the
acquisition were written down (Write-Down). I find that Bonus is larger for acquirers that do not
write down deferred revenues than for acquirers that write down deferred revenues (.113 versus
.059; t-stat= 2.983). However, I find that NEIP is larger for acquirers that write down deferred
revenues than for acquirers that do not write down deferred revenues (.090 versus .122; t-stat=1.926). I also find that Bonus/NEIP for the acquirers that write down deferred revenues is not
statistically different from acquirers that do not write down deferred revenues (.204 versus .182;
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In untabulated analyses, I investigate whether my inferences hold after addressing potential concerns about
influential observations. Summary statistics in Table 2 reveal that even after winsorizing all continuous variables
that are included in the regressions at the 1st and 99th percentiles, there are still extreme values at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. I calculate DFBETAs for my variables of interest and re-estimate equations (1) and (2) after removing
the observations considered influential (DFBETA > 2/√n). All inferences hold after removing 17 influential
observations.
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t-stat= 1.111). These inconsistent and preliminary results may be occurring due to other
characteristics of the acquirers or targets. Therefore, I perform multivariate analyses to control
for other potential determinants of deferred revenue write-downs.
Testing Hypothesis 1
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1) investigating whether the
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive
pay. I estimate the regression three times using either Bonus, NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP, in columns
(1), (2), and (3), respectively. In each of the regressions, I find that the coefficients on Bonus,
NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically significant.26 These results suggest that the
magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive
pay. Using the coefficient estimate on Bonus/NEIP in column (3), the results suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in the Bonus/NEIP leads to a decrease of $3.11 million in the
deferred revenue write-down or a $3.11 million increase in post-acquisition GAAP revenues.
Using the average of 109 million diluted shares for the acquirers in my sample, this equates to a
$0.03 per share increase in future revenues. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that CEOs
with larger proportions of cash incentive pay based on accounting performance metrics reduce
the magnitude of the deferred revenue write-down and potential ghost revenues.
Testing Hypothesis 2
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (2) investigating whether the
relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay
differs when the cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s
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Because 35.6 percent of my sample contains zero values for deferred revenue write-downs, using OLS to
estimate the model potentially raises concerns that I might observe biased coefficients on my incentive pay variables
due to a zero-inflated dependent variable. My inferences hold when I re-estimate equation (1) using a Tobit
regression with and without fixed effects.
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revenues or ghost revenues. I find that the coefficients on Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are
negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the magnitude of deferred
revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay when the
incentive pay is tied to performance metrics that do not adjust for the target’s revenues or
deferred revenues. Additionally, I find in columns (2) and (3) the interactions NEIP*NG and
Bonus/NEIP*NG are positive and statistically significant. F-test results reveal that the
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables (Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP)
and their respective interactions with NG (Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, are Bonus/NEIP*NG) are not
significantly different from zero. These results suggest that the negative relation between
deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when
the cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust for the target’s
revenues or ghost revenues. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that CEOs with larger
proportions of cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust for the
target’s revenues or ghost revenues do not reduce the magnitude of deferred revenue writedowns.
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SECTION V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Non-GAAP Adjustments
Because Table 5 results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue
write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash
incentive pay is tied to certain non-GAAP performance metrics, I next explore the impact of each
non-GAAP adjustment. To do this, in Table 6, I re-estimate equation (2) replacing NG with NG
organic in columns (1) – (3), and NG Def Rev in columns (4) – (6). NG organic is an indicator
variable set equal to 1 if the CEO’s cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that
excludes the target's revenue, and 0 otherwise. NG Def Rev is an indicator variable set equal to 1
if the CEO’s cash incentive pay is tied to a non-GAAP metric that includes ghost revenues, and 0
otherwise. Consistent with prior results and my first hypothesis, I find that the coefficients on
Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically significant.
I find in columns (1) – (3) that the interactions Bonus*NG organic, NEIP*NG organic,
and Bonus/NEIP*NG organic are statistically insignificant. F-test results reveal that the
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables and their respective interactions
with NG organic are not significantly different from zero except for NEIP and NEIP*NG
organic. These results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs
and the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay exists when the cash incentive pay is tied to nonGAAP performance metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues.
Additionally, I find in columns (5) and (6) that the interactions NEIP*NG Def Rev and
Bonus/NEIP*NG Def Rev are positive and statistically significant. F-test results reveal that the
combination of the coefficients on the incentive pay variables and their respective interactions
with NG Def Rev are significantly different from zero except for Bonus and Bonus*NG Def Rev.
These results suggest that the negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the
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proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not exist when the cash incentive pay is tied to nonGAAP performance metrics that adjust for ghost revenues. Moreover, the significant F-test
results in columns (5) and (6) suggest that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs
increases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP performance metrics
that adjust for ghost revenues (F-test P-values <0.01). Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that
CEOs with larger proportions of cash incentive pay based on non-GAAP performance metrics
that adjust for ghost revenues do not minimize deferred revenue write-downs.
Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence
Next, I investigate whether the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. To test this research question, I regress the
indicator Write Down on the same variables of interest and control variables contained in the
model (1) using the following linear probability model:
Prob(𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 1| 𝑋) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +
𝛼3 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼4 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛼6 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼7 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 +
𝛼8 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛼9 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼10 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼11 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛼12 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε

(3)

The dependent variable, Write Down, is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the acquirer
disclosed in the pro forma balance sheet a write-down of the target’s deferred revenue assumed
in the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Similar to equation (1), a negative and significant 𝛼1
coefficient on each of the incentive pay proxies would be consistent with the occurrence of
deferred revenue write-down decreasing with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay.
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (3) investigating whether the
occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash
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incentive pay. Similar to Table 4, I estimate the regression three times using either Bonus, NEIP,
or Bonus/NEIP, in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. In each of the regressions, I find that
the coefficients on Bonus, NEIP, or Bonus/NEIP are negative and statistically insignificant. 27
These results suggest that the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs does not decrease
with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. I find that that the occurrence of write-downs
increases with the deferred revenue book value (Def Rev (Book)), the size of the target
(DealSize), and the size of the acquirer (Relative). These results are consistent with larger
balances of deferred revenue and larger entities being subject to more scrutiny from valuation
experts, auditors, and/or regulators. I also find that the occurrence of deferred revenue writedowns decreases with the profitability of the target (TrgPM). Overall, the occurrence of deferred
revenue write-down appears to be determined by economic factors and not by compensation
incentives of the acquirers’ CEOs.
Additionally, I investigate whether these prior results differ when the cash incentive pay
is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues. To test
this research question, I use equation (3) but include NG, and interact NG with each of my
incentive pay variables. I use the following linear probability model:
Prob(𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 1| 𝑋) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛾2 𝑁𝐺 +
+ 𝛾3 𝑁𝐺 ∗ (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃, 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃) + 𝛾4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛾5 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑀 +
𝛾6 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑃𝑀 + 𝛾7 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑀 + 𝛾8 𝑇𝑟𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛾9 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛾10 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +
𝛾11 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾12 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾13 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛾14 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝑇𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + ε

27

(4)

I continue to find insignificant coefficients on my cash incentive pay variables when estimating equation (3) and
(4) using a logistic regression with and without fixed effects.
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Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (4) investigating whether the
relation between the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO
cash incentive pay differs when the cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust
for the target’s revenues or deferred revenue write-downs. I find that the coefficients on Bonus,
NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP are statistically insignificant.28 Additionally, I find that the coefficients
on interactions Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG are statistically insignificant. These
results suggest that the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay does not impact the occurrence of
deferred revenue write-downs even when the incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics that
either remove the target’s revenues or include ghost revenues. Overall, these results suggest that
although CEOs may exercise discretion in determining the magnitude of deferred revenue writedowns, their discretion does not extend to avoiding the occurrence of deferred revenue writedowns.

28

I continue to find insignificant coefficients on the interactions when estimating equation (4) using a logistic
regression with and without fixed effects.
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SECTION VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, I investigate the impact of CEOs’ compensation incentives on the fair value
measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions. If CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on
performance metrics tied to post-acquisition GAAP revenue, CEOs have incentives to minimize
the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs in order to maximize the revenue recognized
post-acquisition. However, if CEOs’ cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP metrics adjusted
for the target’s revenues or ghost revenues, CEOs are less likely to benefit from reducing the
magnitude of deferred revenue write-down. Therefore, I hypothesize that the magnitude of
deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay.
Additionally, I hypothesize that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs increases with
the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay tied to non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s
revenues or ghost revenues.
Using a hand-collected sample of 334 material acquisitions, I find that 64 percent of
sample firms write down deferred revenues to fair value and write down $0.15 per share on
average. I find evidence that the magnitude of deferred revenue write-downs decreases with the
proportion of CEO cash incentive pay, consistent with my expectations. Next, I find that the
negative relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash
incentive pay does not exist when CEO cash incentive pay is tied to non-GAAP performance
metrics that adjust for the target’s revenues or deferred revenue write-downs. Furthermore, I find
a positive relation between deferred revenue write-downs and the proportion of CEO cash
incentive pay when cash incentive pay is based on non-GAAP performance metrics that adjust
for ghost revenues. In contrast, I find that the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs does
not decrease with the proportion of CEO cash incentive pay. Finally, I find that CEO cash
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incentive pay based on non-GAAP metrics that adjust for the target’s revenue or ghost revenues
does not impact the occurrence of deferred revenue write-downs. Overall, the occurrence of
deferred revenue write-downs appears to be determined by economic factors and not by
compensation incentives of the acquirers’ CEOs.
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I provide distinctive evidence
that certain managers have incentives to adjust the fair values of deferred revenues to increase
future revenues for the acquirer, which is previously unexplored in the literature. Second, my
study contributes to the research on non-GAAP disclosure and compensation by providing
evidence that certain non-GAAP compensation performance metrics can impact fair value
measurement of deferred revenues in acquisitions. Lastly, I examine a topic of particular interest
to practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. I investigate a topic of interest to the FASB
given their ongoing project to research the potential alternatives for the recognition and
measurement of deferred revenues in business combinations. The FASB recently proposed that
the timing of payment of consideration on a contract should not affect the amount of revenue
recognized by the acquirer. Under the current standard, an acquirer would recognize more
revenues for the same performance obligations if the target’s contracts with customers require
payments over time rather than full payment in advance of the performance obligations. This
suggestion would potentially require more judgment in measuring acquired deferred revenues
because managers would need to estimate the value of what the combined entity expects to
receive at the time of the acquisition date. To the extent that any new accounting standard
increases the judgment involved in determining the fair value of acquirer deferred revenue, I
provide evidence suggesting that managers exercise discretion in the fair value measurement of
deferred revenue to boost post-acquisition revenues. Additionally, my results should be of
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interest to audit professionals and researchers. External auditors are now required to identify
critical audit matters (CAMs) in audit reports. These are disclosures by auditors that identify
material accounts or disclosures that involve especially challenging, complex, or subjective
judgment during the audit engagement. In 2019, the most common CAM subjects were
“Business Combinations” and “Revenues from customer contracts” (Burke, Hoitash, Hoitash,
and Xiao 2020). My study examines an issue at the intersection of these important subject areas.
I provide evidence suggesting that auditors should consider managers’ incentives to minimize
deferred revenue write-downs and acknowledge the potentially subjective judgment involved in
estimating deferred revenue fair values. Overall, the results of my study provide information of
particular interest to practitioners, regulators, and standard setters who, when developing and
implementing the standards surrounding deferred revenue valuation in acquisitions, must
consider managers' incentives to minimize deferred revenue write-downs.

35

REFERENCES

36

Altamuro, J., A. L. Beatty, and J. Weber. 2005. The effects of accelerated revenue recognition on
earnings management and earnings informativeness: Evidence from SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 101. The Accounting Review 80 (2): 373–401.
Ashby, J., J. A. Chyz, L. A. Myers, and B. Whipple. 2020. The impact of non-GAAP disclosure
on the purchase price allocation to definite-lived intangible assets in mergers and acquisitions.
Working paper, The University of Tennessee and University of Georgia.
Barth, M. E. 1994. Fair value accounting: Evidence from investment securities and the market
valuation of banks. The Accounting Review 69 (1): 1–25.
______, W. H. Beaver, and W. R. Landsman. 1996. Value-relevance of banks' fair value
disclosures under SFAS No. 107. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 513–537.
Beatty A., and J. Weber. 2006. Accounting discretion in fair value estimates: An examination of
SFAS 142 goodwill impairments. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2): 257–288.
Black, D., E. Black, T. Christensen, and K. Gee. 2020. The Use of Non-GAAP EPS for
Compensation Contracting and Financial Reporting, Working paper, University of NebraskaLincoln, University of Oklahoma, University of Georgia, and Pennsylvania State University.
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343140
Blankespoor, E., T. J. Linsmeier, K. R. Petroni, and C. Shakespeare. 2013. Fair value accounting
for financial instruments: Does it improve the association between bank leverage and credit
risk? The Accounting Review 88 (4): 1143–1177.
Blann, J., J. L. Campbell, J. E. Shipman, and Z. Wiebe. 2020. Evidence on the Decision
Usefulness of Fair Values in Business Combinations. Working paper, University of Arkansas
and University of Georgia. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568820
Bugeja, M., and A. Loyeung. 2015. What drives the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill?
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 11 (3): 245–261.
Burke, J., R. Hoitash, U. Hoitash, and X. Xiao. 2020. An Investigation of US Critical Audit
Matter Disclosures. Working paper, University of Colorado at Denver, Bentley University, and
Northeastern University. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635477
Cadman, B., M. E. Carter, and S. Hillegeist. 2010. The incentives of compensation consultants
and CEO pay. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (3): 263–280.
Campbell, J. L., K. H. Gee, and Z. Wiebe. 2020. The Determinants and Informativeness of NonGAAP Revenue Disclosures. Working paper, University of Georgia, Pennsylvania State
University, and University of Arkansas. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3564204
Caylor, M. L. 2010. Strategic revenue recognition to achieve earnings benchmarks. Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy 29 (1): 82–95.
37

Chen, C. W. 2019. The disciplinary role of financial statements: evidence from mergers and
acquisitions of privately held targets. Journal of Accounting Research 57 (2): 391-430.
Core, J. E., W. R. Guay, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2003. Price versus non‐price performance
measures in optimal CEO compensation contracts. The Accounting Review 78 (4): 957–981.
Dechow, P. M., L. A. Myers, and C. Shakespeare. 2010. Fair value accounting and gains from
asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation sidebenefits. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (1-2): 2–25.
Dickinson, V., D. D. Wangerin, and J. J. Wild. 2016. Accounting rules and post-acquisition
profitability in business combinations. Accounting Horizons 30 (4): 427–447.
Dietrich, J. R., M. S. Harris, and K. A. Muller III. 2000. The reliability of investment property
fair value estimates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (2): 125–158.
Eccher, E. A., K. Ramesh. and S. R. Thiagarajan. 1996. Fair value disclosures by bank holding
companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22 (1-3): 79–117.
Fontes, J. C., A. Panaretou, and K. V. Peasnell. 2018. The impact of fair value measurement for
bank assets on information asymmetry and the moderating effect of own credit risk gains and
losses. The Accounting Review 93 (6): 127–147.
Guest, N. M., S. P. Kothari, and R. Pozen. 2020. High non-GAAP earnings predict abnormally
high CEO pay. Working paper, Cornell University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3030953
King, Z., T. Linsmeier, and D. Wangerin. 2019. Differences in the value relevance of identifiable
intangible assets acquired in business combinations. Working paper, University of Wisconsin –
Madison. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438250
Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and I. R. Tuna. 2007. Corporate governance, accounting
outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review 82 (4): 963–1008.
Leone, A. J., M. Minutti-Meza, and C. E. Wasley. 2019. Influential observations and inference in
accounting research. The Accounting Review 94 (6): 337–364.
Li, K. K., and R. G. Sloan. 2017. Has goodwill accounting gone bad? Review of Accounting
Studies 22 (2): 964–1003.
Lynch, D., M. Romney, B. Stomberg, and D. Wangerin. 2019. Trade‐offs between tax and
financial reporting benefits: Evidence from purchase price allocations in taxable acquisitions.
Contemporary Accounting Research 36 (3): 1223–1262.

38

Magnan, M., A. Menini, and A. Parbonetti. 2015. Fair value accounting: information or
confusion for financial markets? Review of Accounting Studies 20 (1): 559–591.
McInnis, J. M., and B. Monsen. 2020. The operating returns to acquired intangible
assets. Working paper, The University of Texas at Austin and The Ohio State University.
Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279123
Murphy, K. J. 1999. Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics 3: 2485–2563.
Murphy, K. J. 2013. Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. Handbook
of the Economics of Finance 2: 211-356.
Myers, L. A., R. Schmardebeck, T. A. Seidel, and M. D. Stuart. 2020. The Impact of Increased
Managerial Discretion on the Usefulness of Reported Revenues: Evidence from Accounting
Standard Updates for Multiple-Deliverable Sales Arrangements. Working paper, The University
of Tennessee, Brigham Young University, and Vanderbilt University. Available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559438
Nelson, K. K. 1996. Fair value accounting for commercial banks: An empirical analysis of SFAS
No. 107. The Accounting Review 71 (2): 161–182.
Paugam, L., P. Astolfi, and O. Ramond. 2015. Accounting for business combinations: Do
purchase price allocations matter? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 34 (4): 362–391.
Prakash, R., and N. Sinha. 2013. Deferred revenues and the matching of revenues and
expenses. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (2): 517–548.
Ramanna, K., and R. Watts. 2012. Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required
goodwill impairment. Review of Accounting Studies 17 (4): 749–780.
Shalev, R. 2009. The information content of business combination disclosure level. The
Accounting Review 84 (1): 239–270.
______, I. Zhang, and Y. Zhang. 2013. CEO compensation and fair value accounting: Evidence
from purchase price allocation. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (4): 819–854.
Song, C. J., W. B. Thomas, and H. Yi. 2010. Value relevance of FAS No. 157 fair value
hierarchy information and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. The Accounting
Review 85 (4): 1375–1410.
Srivastava, A. 2014. Selling-price estimates in revenue recognition and the usefulness of
financial statements. Review of Accounting Studies 19 (2): 661–697.
Zhang, I. X., and Y. Zhang. 2017. Accounting discretion and purchase price allocation after
acquisitions. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 32 (2): 241–270.

39

APPENDICES

40

Appendix A
Variable Descriptions
Deal Value
Deferred Revenue Book Value
Deferred Revenue Fair Value
Deferred Revenue Write-Down
Def Rev Fair Value Percent
Def Rev Write-Down Percent
Def Rev (Book)
Def Rev Write-Down
Write-Down
Write-Down Per Share

Bonus
NEIP

Bonus/NEIP

CAR

TrgPM

AcqPM
PeerPM

Deal value of the target reported in the 8-K/A or S-4 in
millions
Deferred revenue book value from the companies 8-K/A or
S-4 in millions
Deferred revenue fair value from the companies 8-K/A or S4 in millions
Deferred revenue write-down from the companies 8-K/A or
S-4 in millions
Deferred revenue fair value scaled by the deferred revenue
book value
Deferred revenue write-down scaled by the Deferred
Revenue Book-Value
Deferred revenue book value scaled by the target’s deal
value
Deferred revenue write-down scaled by the target’s deal
value
Indicator variable equal to 1 if target’s deferred revenue is
written down, and 0 otherwise
Target’s deferred revenue write-down scaled by the
acquirer’s common shares (cshfd) at the end of the
acquisition year
Acquirer CEO's bonus compensation scaled by the acquirer
CEO's total compensation in the year of the acquisition
Acquirer CEO's non-equity incentive pay compensation
scaled by the acquirer CEO's total compensation in the year
of the acquisition
Sum of the acquirer CEO's non-equity incentive pay
compensation and acquirer CEO's bonus compensation
scaled by the acquirer CEO's total compensation in the year
of the acquisition
Three-day cumulative abnormal return around the
acquisition announcement; the abnormal return is computed
using the market model, where the parameters of the model
are estimated over the window (271,21) trading days
preceding the acquisition announcement and the market
return is measured as the return to the CRSP equally
weighted index
Target’s operating earnings scaled by sales for the last fiscal
year period reported in the target’s 8-K/A or S-4 or
Compustat
Acquirer’s operating earnings scaled by sales
Median operating earnings scaled by sales for public firms in
the target’s 2-digit SIC code industry
41

TrgPublic
PctStock
Relative
DealSize
SameInd
AcqMTB
Goodwill
NG

NG Def Rev

NG Organic

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a public firm, and
0 otherwise
Percentage of consideration paid for the target consisting of
stock
Acquirer’s pre-acquisition total assets scaled by the target’s
deal value
Log of the target’s deal value
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target share
the same 2-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise
Acquirer’s pre-acquisition market to book ratio.
Target’s goodwill scaled by the target’s deal value reported
in the target’s 8-K/A or S-4
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP
earnings, etc.) that doesn't include the impact of revenues
from the target or the deferred revenue write-downs, and 0
otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP
earnings, etc.) that adjusts for the deferred revenue writedowns, and 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO's compensation is
tied to a non-GAAP metric (non-GAAP revenue, non-GAAP
earnings, etc.) that doesn't include the impact of revenues
from the target, and 0 otherwise

42

Appendix B
Tables
Table 1
Sample Selection
Number of
Deals
Number of material deals in SDC between January 2003 to December 2018
where the acquirer has a deferred revenue balance post-acquisition (or where
public targets have a deferred revenue balance pre-acquisition)

810

No 8-K/A or S-4, no pro forma balance sheet, or no deferred revenue balance
reported

(412)

Deals with deferred revenue write-ups

(5)

Deals with missing Compustat data

(13)

Deals with no CEO compensation data (missing DEF 14A and
EXECUCOMP data)

(19)

Deals with no announcement return data

(27)

Final Sample

334
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLES (N =334)

(1)
mean

(2)
Std dev.

(3)
p1

Deal Value
Deferred Revenue Book Value
Deferred Revenue Fair Value
Deferred Revenue Write-Down
Def Rev Fair Value Percent
Def Rev Write-Down Percent
Write-Down Per Share
Write-Down
Def Rev Write-Down
Bonus
NEIP
Bonus/NEIP
Def Rev (Book)
CAR
TrgPM
AcqPM
PeerPM
TrgPublic
PctStock
Relative
DealSize
SameInd
AcqMTB
Goodwill

780.7
41.93
26.30
15.68
0.678
0.324
0.156
0.644
0.037
0.0785
0.111
0.190
0.102
0.0109
-0.455
0.0236
0.0104
0.347
0.224
3.378
5.046
0.707
4.370
0.544

2,001
141.6
98.96
62.30
0.346
0.344
0.445
0.480
0.087
0.147
0.146
0.166
0.167
0.126
1.952
0.365
0.0788
0.477
0.329
3.951
1.857
0.456
5.925
0.253

2.704
0.039
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.273
-13.11
-2.788
-0.343
0.000
0.000
0.204
0.995
0.000
-3.792
0.000

(4)
p25

(5)
p50

(6)
p75

39.47
186.0
538.1
1.373
6.059
25.30
0.418
2.797
14.56
0.000
1.002
7.235
0.429
0.777
1.000
0.000
0.223
0.571
0.000
0.019
0.130
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.007
0.029
0.000
0.000 0.0948
0.000
0.000
0.195
0.0601 0.161
0.269
0.0119 0.0414 0.114
-0.040 0.00457 0.0628
-0.126 0.0284 0.122
-0.004 0.0768 0.159
0.007 0.0318 0.0496
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.398
1.585
2.799
3.810
3.675
5.226
6.288
0.000
1.000
1.000
1.905
3.130
4.989
0.380
0.538
0.725

(7)
p99
13,041
601.3
271
354.5
1.000
1.000
2.521
1.000
0.612
0.624
0.631
0.684
0.989
0.420
0.352
0.402
0.103
1.000
1.000
31.10
9.476
1.000
49.60
1.272

This panel presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. I winsorize all continuous variables
that are included in the regressions at the 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in the
Appendix
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Table 3
Univariate Analysis
Partitioning Variable = Write-Down
Write-Down = 0

Write-Down = 1

VARIABLES

(N=119)
mean

(N=215)
mean

Difference

Bonus
NEIP
Bonus/NEIP
Def Rev (Book)
CAR
TrgPM
AcqPM
PeerPM
TrgPublic
PctStock
Relative
DealSize
SameInd
AcqMTB
Goodwill
NG

0.113
0.090
0.204
0.057
0.015
-0.385
-0.019
-0.010
0.294
0.257
3.115
4.584
0.647
3.496
0.560
0.059

0.059
0.122
0.182
0.127
0.009
-0.494
0.047
0.021
0.377
0.205
3.524
5.302
0.740
4.854
0.535
0.112

0.054***
-0.032**
0.022
-0.07***
0.006
0.109
-0.066*
-0.031***
-0.083*
0.052*
-0.409
-0.718***
-0.093**
-1.358***
0.025
-0.053**

This panel presents descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables for the
sample. I separate the observations based on Write Down. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests) using
a t-test of difference in means. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Table 4
Incentive Pay and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Prediction Def Rev Write- Def Rev Write- Def Rev WriteDown
Down
Down
Bonus

-

NEIP

-

Bonus/NEIP

-

Def Rev (Book)
CAR
TrgPM
AcqPM
PeerPM
TrgPublic
PctStock
DealSize
Relative
SameInd
AcqMTB
Goodwill
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Trg. Industry & Year FE

-0.021**
(0.031)
-0.017*
(0.059)

0.393***
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.260)
-0.001
(0.449)
-0.017
(0.224)
-0.041
(0.635)
-0.003
(0.785)
-0.003
(0.822)
0.004**
(0.029)
0.000
(0.379)
-0.009*
(0.057)
0.000
(0.682)
-0.063***
(0.003)
0.012
(0.663)
334
0.523
YES

0.394***
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.271)
-0.001
(0.431)
-0.018
(0.202)
-0.052
(0.555)
-0.003
(0.769)
-0.004
(0.783)
0.005**
(0.012)
0.000
(0.358)
-0.010**
(0.047)
0.000
(0.830)
-0.065***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.849)
334
0.522
YES

-0.024**
(0.026)
0.392***
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.256)
-0.001
(0.449)
-0.017
(0.206)
-0.045
(0.616)
-0.003
(0.777)
-0.004
(0.790)
0.005**
(0.016)
0.000
(0.372)
-0.009*
(0.054)
0.000
(0.850)
-0.062***
(0.004)
0.010
(0.725)
334
0.524
YES

This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in each
column is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, and
Bonus/NEIP. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values
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are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of interest, and two-tailed tests for controls).
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Table 5
Non-GAAP Incentive Pay Metrics and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude
VARIABLES

Prediction

Bonus

-

NEIP

-

Bonus/NEIP

-

NG
Bonus*NG

+

NEIP*NG

+

Bonus/NEIP*NG

+

(1)
Def Rev WriteDown

(2)
Def Rev WriteDown

(3)
Def Rev WriteDown

-0.020**
(0.032)
-0.023*
(0.060)

0.001
(0.765)
0.005
(0.473)

-0.006
(0.268)

-0.028**
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.143)

0.053*
(0.051)
0.061**
(0.030)

F-Test B1+B3 =0
P-value
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Controls
Trg. Industry & Year FE

.06
.8137
334
0.520
YES
YES

2.20
.1506
334
0.520
YES
YES

2.56
.1219
334
0.522
YES
YES

This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in
columns (1) – (3) is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP,
Bonus/NEIP, Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of
interest, and two-tailed tests for controls).
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Table 6
Non-GAAP Adjustments and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Magnitude
VARIABLES

Prediction

Bonus

-

NEIP

-

Bonus/NEIP

-

NG Organic

(1)
Def Rev
WriteDown

(2)
Def Rev
WriteDown

(3)
Def Rev
WriteDown

-0.021**
(0.030)
-0.016*
(0.090)

-0.009
(0.242)

+

NEIP*NG Organic

+

Bonus/NEIP*
NG Organic
Bonus*NG Def Rev

+

NEIP*NG Def Rev

+

Bonus/NEIP*
NG Def Rev

+

(6)
Def Rev
WriteDown

0.002
(0.808)

-0.025**
(0.038)
-0.024**
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.886)

-0.028**
(0.022)

0.009**
(0.032)

Bonus*NG Organic

(5)
Def Rev
WriteDown

-0.019**
(0.038)

NG Def Rev

F-Test B1+B3 =0
P-value
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Controls
Trg. Industry &
Year FE

(4)
Def Rev
WriteDown

-0.007*
(0.056)

-0.009**
(0.035)

0.156
(0.161)
-0.049
(0.905)
-0.029
(0.736)

+

-0.080
(0.902)
0.093***
(0.001)
0.092***
(0.001)
.76
.3927
334
0.520
YES
YES

4.84
.0373
334
0.520
YES
YES

1.91
.1795
334
0.521
YES
YES

2.87
.1026
334
0.520
YES
YES

8.93
.0062
334
0.521
YES
YES

8.26
.0082
334
0.522
YES
YES

This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in each
column is Def Rev Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, Bonus/NEIP,
Bonus*NG Organic, NEIP *NG Organic, Bonus/NEIP*NG Organic, Bonus*NG Def Rev, NEIP*NG
Def Rev, and Bonus/NEIP*NG Def Rev. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target
industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of interest, and
two-tailed tests for controls).
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Table 7
Incentive Pay and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence
VARIABLES

Prediction

Bonus

-

NEIP

-

Bonus/NEIP

-

Def Rev (Book)
CAR
TrgPM
AcqPM
PeerPM
TrgPublic
PctStock
Relative
DealSize
SameInd
AcqMTB
Goodwill
Constant
Observations
Adj. R-squared
Trg. Industry & Year FE

(1)
Write-Down

(2)
Write-Down

(3)
Write-Down

-0.056
(0.404)
-0.009
(0.468)

0.757***
(0.000)
-0.293
(0.233)
-0.019***
(0.000)
-0.019
(0.808)
0.421
(0.204)
-0.091
(0.118)
0.123**
(0.020)
0.008**
(0.049)
0.096***
(0.000)
0.020
(0.847)
0.004**
(0.031)
-0.310***
(0.005)
0.067
(0.506)
334
0.184
YES

0.762***
(0.000)
-0.293
(0.232)
-0.019***
(0.000)
-0.022
(0.775)
0.400
(0.192)
-0.091
(0.125)
0.122**
(0.021)
0.008**
(0.050)
0.097***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.850)
0.004**
(0.037)
-0.316***
(0.001)
0.055
(0.642)
334
0.184
YES

-0.046
(0.376)
0.757***
(0.000)
-0.293
(0.229)
-0.019***
(0.000)
-0.019
(0.805)
0.409
(0.187)
-0.091
(0.122)
0.121**
(0.028)
0.008*
(0.054)
0.097***
(0.000)
0.020
(0.847)
0.004**
(0.027)
-0.310***
(0.003)
0.060
(0.586)
334
0.185
YES

This table presents the results of the linear probability regression analysis. The dependent variable in
each column is Write Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, and Bonus/NEIP.
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by target industry) robust p-values are presented
below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of interest, and two-tailed tests for controls).
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Table 8
Non-GAAP Incentive Pay Metrics and Deferred Revenue Write-Down Occurrence
VARIABLES

(1)
Write-Down

Prediction

Bonus

-

NEIP

-

Bonus/NEIP

-

+

NEIP*NG

+

Bonus/NEIP *NG

+

(3)
Write-Down

-0.062
(0.392)
0.110
(0.122)

NG
Bonus*NG

(2)
Write-Down

-0.019
(0.752)
0.522
(0.180)

0.173**
(0.026)

0.023
(0.445)
0.190
(0.131)

-1.134
(0.992)

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Controls
Trg. Industry & Year FE

334
0.179
YES
YES

334
0.189
YES
YES

-1.109
(0.958)
334
0.189
YES
YES

This table presents the results of the fixed effect regression analysis. The dependent variable in
columns (1) – (3) is Write-Down. The variables of interest in this table are Bonus, NEIP, Bonus/NEIP,
Bonus*NG, NEIP*NG, and Bonus/NEIP*NG. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Cluster (by
target industry) robust p-values are presented below the coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests for variables of
interest, and two-tailed tests for controls).
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